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An Empirical Analysis of Bundling and Tying: 
Over-the-Counter Pain Relief and Cold Medicines 
 








At virtually any pharmacy, grocery store, or convenience store, one can purchase 
“cold tablets” that contain more than one active ingredient. The main components of 
these medicines are pain relievers, decongestants, antihistamines, and cough 
suppressants. Tablets (or other dosage forms) containing just one of the ingredients are 
also available. The tablets that contain more than one active ingredient are therefore 
examples of bundled products.
1 In this paper, we establish that the bundle discount is 
substantial and use a cost-based framework to estimate the cost savings from bundled 
products. 
Our theoretical framework is based on the cost-based, unified theory of bundling 
and tying developed in Evans and Salinger (2004a). Under that theory, a bundle discount 
can be the result of two distinct cost effects. One is marginal cost savings (that could 
arise from, for example, conserving on the number of packages and tablets produced). 
The other is a reduction in the contribution to fixed costs of each product offering (such 
as the cost of a shelf slot or the system cost of an additional stock keeping unit). As we 
will explain,
2 whether the private savings consumers get from the bundle reflect social 
savings as well depends on the relative contribution of each. Thus, to estimate cost 
savings from bundling, we must empirically identify these two effects. 
                                                 
1 A bundled product is one that combines more than one product that could be sold separately. 
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To do so, we exploit regularities in the pricing of different package sizes. The 
price per tablet for any given medication tends to be a decreasing function of package 
size.
3 Suppose, for example, that a particular medicine––acetaminophen––is available in 
packages of 50, 100, and 200 tablets, with the price per tablet a decreasing function of 
tablet size. There seems no reason to rule out the possibility that some customers would 
ideally like to purchase 150 tablets. Such a customer could either buy one package of 100 
tablets and one of 50 tablets, thus sacrificing potential economies of package size, or one 
package of 200 tablets that contains 50 more tablets than he wants. We estimate how high 
fixed costs would have to be to make it unprofitable to offer package sizes that we do not 
observe. As a basis for these estimates, we extend the model in Evans and Salinger 
(2004a) to package-size effects. 
We estimate that, in this case, the marginal cost savings from bundled products 
exceed the fixed costs of the product offerings, so bundling lowers costs. For example, 
we estimate that the price of a package of 48 tablets that combines two active ingredients 
is $3.60 less
4 than the sum of the prices of the same ingredients sold in separate packages 
of 48 tablets each. We decompose this $3.60 into a marginal cost savings of $2.40 and an 
average fixed cost of $1.20. The net cost effect is the difference between the two, or 
$1.20. The gain would be substantially larger for tablets that contain three active 
ingredients. Moreover, these cost effects do not capture the value of the convenience 
consumers get from bundled products. 
                                                                                                                                                 
2 See Section III. 
3 While this assertion should come as no surprise, we document the regularity in Section II. 
4 The percentage difference would vary with the active ingredients but would generally be between 30 
percent and 50 percent. 
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We can also use our framework to estimate the cost savings from having the 
separate products available rather than having consumers who want just one component 
buy the bundled product. This type of calculation is important for addressing the policy 
issues associated with the antitrust laws concerning tying. Tying occurs when a bundled 
product is offered and at least one of the separate products is not. Since tying can be an 
antitrust violation, the law encourages companies, at least those with market power, to 
offer the products that it bundles separately as well. For a consumer who wants just one 
component of a bundle, buying the separate component rather than the bundle saves the 
marginal cost of the components he does not want. However, the separate component is 
itself a distinct product that generates a fixed cost of offering it. Selling the separate 
component only saves costs if the fixed cost is less than marginal costs avoided by not 
providing a customer with the part of a bundle he does not want. While in most of the 
cases we consider, our estimates are that the separate products save costs, there is one 
case in which we estimate that it does not. Of course, this result does not imply that the 
separate product should not be offered in this case. In the example we consider, 
consumers who want, for example, just pain relief, would strictly prefer not to have to 
take a decongestant at the same time. Just as a complete welfare analysis of bundling and 
tying would have to account for the convenience value of the bundle for consumers who 
want all the components, so would it also have to account for the possibility that some 
consumers would pay not to have a component of a bundle. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the data 
and establishes some broad empirical regularities in it. Section III describes our 
framework for understanding bundling and tying, applies it to the bundle discount, and 
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derives the formulas to calculate the (possibly negative) cost savings from the bundle and 
from the separate products. In Section IV, we extend the cost-based theory to package-
size effects and derive the formula to calculate the average fixed cost of a good. We then 
estimate the average fixed costs and use them to in turn estimate the effect of bundling 
and components sales on costs.  The concluding section provides a brief summary. 
 
II. The Pricing of Pain Relief, Cold, Sinus, and Allergy Medicines 
 
The primary data collected for this paper were the prices of all cold
5 and pain relief 
medications sold at the Walgreens
6 at 757 N. Michigan Ave. in Chicago on April 3, 2003. 
For each package, we observe the brand, the price, dosage form,
7 quantity of each active 
ingredient per unit, and number of units. We have supplemented the data with some prices 
offered at the website of CVS
8 and have generally checked prices on the web and at other 
outlets to confirm that the regularities we document are not specific to this particular 
location and time. 
A. Empirical Regularities 
 
We will ultimately use a price regression to describe the bundle discount. To 
guide the specification of that regression, it will be useful to explore less formally some 
strong regularities that are present in the data. We will also use these stylized facts to 
argue for a cost-based explanation for the bundle discount. 
                                                 
5 We use the term “cold” to include medications labeled as sinus, allergy, and cough as well. 
6 Walgreens is a large pharmacy chain in the United States. 
7 Dosage forms include tablets, caplets, liquid, “gel tabs,” etc. 
8 The website www.cvs.com is a vehicle for ordering pharamaceuticals (and other products) to be delivered 
by mail. The website is operated by CVS, which also operates a large chain of retail pharmacies. 
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1.  Bundle Discounts and Brand Name Premia  
 
Johnson & Johnson’s Tylenol is the dominant brand of the pain reliever 
acetaminophen and Pfizer’s Sudafed is the dominant brand of the decongestant 
pseudoephedrine hydrochloride. Each Extra Strength Tylenol contains 500 mg of 
acetaminophen and each Maximum Strength Sudafed contains 30 mg of pseudoephedrine 
hydrochoride. Johnson & Johnson does not offer a Tylenol-brand pseudoephedrine 
hydrochloride nor does Pfizer offer a Sudafed-brand acetaminophen. However, both a 
Tylenol Sinus Caplet and a Sudafed Sinus and Headache Caplet contain 30 mg of 
pseudoephedrine hydrochloride and 500 mg of acetaminophen.
9 Table 1 lists the prices 
we observed for 24-tablet packages of these products and for their store-brand 
equivalents.
10 Table 1 illustrates two general phenomena in the pricing of this class of 
product. First, branded products command a substantial premium—from just over 30 
percent to 50 percent—over the price of the CVS product. Second, within both the 
branded and non-branded segments, the price of the combination product is much lower 
than the sum of the prices of the stand-alone products. The incremental cost to a 
consumer of the pseudoephedrine hydrochloride in the Tylenol Sinus Caplet over 
purchasing just Extra Strength Tylenol is $2.00, which is only 44 percent of the price of 
buying a package of 24 Sudafed tablets. The incremental price of the acetaminophen in 
the Sudafed Sinus and Headache Caplets is $1.40, which is 35 percent of the price of 
buying a package of 24 Extra Strength Tylenol tablets. The comparisons are even more 
                                                 
9 Novartis also offers a product that contains 500 mg of acetaminophen and 30 mg of pseudoephedrine 
hydrochloride, Tavist Allery/Sinus/Headache. 
10 These data are taken from www.cvs.com rather than our Walgreens data set. To isolate the bundle 
discount, we need to hold package size constant. To do so, we need all six of the products in Table 1 (just 
acetaminophen, just pseudophedrine, and the combination tablet in branded and generic form) available in 
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striking with the CVS products. The incremental price of the acetaminophen in the 
combination product over pseudoephedrine hydrochloride tablets is only $0.50, or 17 
percent of the price of buying acetaminophen tablets separately.
11 
Table 1. Prices for 24 Tablet/Caplet Packages 
Brand Combination Pseudoephedrine HCl Alone Acetaminophen Alone
Tylenol $5.99 NA $3.99 
Sudafed $5.99 $4.59  NA
CVS $3.99 $3.49 $2.99   
 
Note:  Tylenol: “Tylenol Sinus Caplet” (the combination product) and “Tylenol Extra Strength Caplets.” 
Sudafed: “Sudafed Sinus and Headache Caplet” (the combination product) and “Sudafed Sinus & Cold.” 
CVS: “Non-Aspirin Sinus Caplets Maximum Strength” (the combination product), “Nasal Decongestant 
Tablets Maximum Strength,” and “Non-Aspirin Caplets Extra Strength.” NA denotes a combination that 
was not offered. Doses are 30 mg of pseudoephedrine hydrochloride and 500 mg of acetaminophen. 
Source:  Downloaded from CVS website, http://www.cvs.com, February 11, 2004. 
There are also products that combine pseudoephedrine hydrochloride and ibuprofen. 
Here, the comparisons are not quite as clean because we observed package sizes of 20 rather 
than 24 for the combination product. Still, as we will document in section II.A.3 below (and 
as is well known), the price per pill is generally a decreasing function of package size. Thus, 
comparing the price per pill of the bundled product with the sum of the prices per pill of the 
component products sold in somewhat larger packages understates the gains from bundling. 
We observed a price of $6.29 for a package of 20 Advil “Cold & Sinus” tablets, which is 
less than $0.32/tablet. To buy Advil and Maximum Strength Sudafed separately in 24-tablet 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
a common package size. Our Walgreens data set did not generate such a comparison, but the data we 
obained from the CVS website did. 
11 In our Walgreens data set, the comparable prices were $6.99 for 24 Tylenol Sinus tablets, $4.99 for 24 
Extra Tylenol tablets, and $6.79 for 24 Sudafed. Thus, the price of the branded combination product was 
only $0.20 higher than the stand alone Sudafed product. For the Walgreens brands, the prices were $2.99 
for 24 tablets of extra strength acetaminophen and $3.49 for 24 maximum strenght pseudoephedrine 
hydrochloride tablets. While we did not observe a Walgreens version that combined just these two active 
ingredients, we did observe a package of 24 tablets with these two ingredients and 25 milligrams of the 
antihistimine, Diphenhydramine HCl. The price was $3.99.  
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packages, the sum of the prices per pill would be more than $0.49/tablet.
12 On a per-pill 
basis, the price of the bundled product was 64 percent of the price of the components. For 
the store-brand versions, the per-pill price of the bundled product was less than $0.21, which 
was 21 percent less than $0.27, the sum of the per-pill prices of the two separate products.
13 
The strong stylized fact that emerges from this set of comparisons is that the prices 
consumers pay for combinations of medicines—both branded and store-brand—are 
substantially less than the prices they would pay to buy the same active ingredients as 
separate medicines. Of course, consumers who want all the components of the combination 
medicines likely get convenience as well as the lower price. 
2.  Pricing of Different Dosages 
 
The phenomenon of lower prices for combining the same active ingredient into 
fewer pills and distinct packages that we observed with combination drugs applies to 
different doses of the same medicine. 
a) Pain  Relievers 
 
Tylenol comes in three dosage forms for adults:
14 Regular Strength (325 mg/tablet), 
Extra Strength (500 mg/tablet), and Arthritis Strength (650 mg/tablet). In a sense, each 
Arthritis Strength tablet is a bundle of two Regular Strength tablets. As a result, buying two 
packages of, say, 100 Regular Strength Tylenol rather than one package of 100 Extra 
                                                 
12 The price we observed for 24 Advil was $4.99. As reported in note 11, we observed a price of $6.79 at 
Walgreens for a package of 24 Sudafed. 
13 The Walgreens products are WalProfem tablets (ibuprofen), WalPhed (pseudoephedrine hydrochloride) 
and WalProfem Cold & Sinus. The prices we observed were $4.29 for 20 WalProfem Cold & Sinus 
Tablets, $2.99 for 24 WalProfem tablets, and $3.49 for 24 WalPhed tablets. 
14 It also comes in junior and children’s doses. 
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Strength Tylenol is analagous to buying Tylenol and Sudafed separately rather than in 
"sinus tablet" form. 
Table 2 presents prices we observed that reveal the economies of combining 
products as well as the general pricing structure for Tylenol. First, note that in the two cases 
in which the number of tablets is held constant (50 and 100), the incremental price of the 
higher levels of extra ingredients is small. At the 50-tablet size, the arthritis strength contains 
30 percent more active ingredient for an incremental price of only $0.20, or 2.8 percent. At 
the 100-tablet size, the Arthritis Strength price is 10 percent higher than the Extra Strength 
price. In turn, Extra Strength contains approximately 50 percent more active ingredient than 
regular strength for an incremental price of $0.60 or 6.4 percent. The comparison that most 
corresponds to the bundling comparison in the previous section is between purchasing one 
package of 100 Arthritis Strength tablets and two packages of 100 Regular Strength Tablets. 
The amount of active ingredient is the same, but buying two packages of Regular Strength 
entails two packages rather than one and twice as many tablets. As Table 2 indicates, the 
price of the one Arthritis Strength package is $10.99 while the price of two Regular Strength 
packages is $18.78.
15 
Table 2. Prices for Different Tylenol Dosages 
Regular Strength Extra Strength Arthritis Strength
(325 mg)  (500 mg)  (650 mg) 
50 $7.19 $7.39 
60 $7.89 





Source:  Prices observed at Walgreens at 757 N. Michigan Ave. in Chicago on April 3, 2003. 
 
                                                 
15 Note further that a package of 60 Extra Strength Tylenol has about the same active ingredient as 100 
Regular Strength and costs $1.50 less. 
8 Preliminary – Do not redistribute or cite without permission 
 
Table 3 shows similar data for Walgreens’ acetaminophen. Here, the evidence is 
more mixed. The clean comparison that is comparable to the cold medicines is the 100-
tablet size. The total price of two packages of Regular Strength acetaminophen is $9.98, 
which is about 25 percent more than the $7.99 price of a single package of Arthritis 
Strength. However, it is not universally true that the per-milligram price of the arthritis 
strength is lower than the per-milligram price of the others.
16 
 
Table 3. Prices for Different Walgreens Acetaminophen Dosages and Package Sizes 
Regular Strength Extra Strength Arthritis Strength
(325 mg)  (500 mg)  (650 mg) 
24 $2.99 $3.99 
50 $5.49 
60 $3.99 
100 $4.99 $5.99 $7.99 
175 $7.99 





Source:  Prices observed at Walgreens at 757 N. Michigan Ave. in Chicago on April 3, 2003. 
                                                 
16 All but one of the prices in Table 3 are $0.01 less than an even dollar, with the other being $0.01 less 
than an integral multiple of $0.50. This feature of the pricing could be part of the explanation for why the 
price of Arthritis Strength does not show evidence of bundling efficiencies. For example, a price of $3.49 
for the package of 24 might not be sufficient to cover the incremental cost. Also, as we will discuss further 
below, if demand for this package size of Arthritis Strength is sufficiently low, then a higher margin might 
be needed to cover the fixed cost of the shelf space. 
9 Preliminary – Do not redistribute or cite without permission 
b) Decongestants 
 
Pseudoephedrine hydrochloride comes in three dosage forms. “Maximum 
Strength” contains 30 mg per tablet. The “12-hour version” contains 120 mg per tablet 
and the “24-hour version” contains 240 mg per tablet. Table 4 lists the prices that we 
observed for different package sizes and dosage forms of Sudafed, Contac (another brand 
of pseudoephedrine hydrochloride) and Walgreens pseudoephedrine hydrochloride. Table 
4 provides one clean comparison that is analogous to the bundling analysis above. The 
price of one package of ten 24-hour Sudafed tablets is $9.99, whereas the sum of the 
prices of two packages of ten 12-hour Sudafed tablets is $12.98. Note further that the 
price of five 24-hour Sudafed tablets is somewhat less than the price of ten 12-hour 
tablets and that the price of ten 24-hour Sudafed tablets is somewhat less than the price of 
twenty 12-hour tablets. The differences are not large. However, the obvious source of 
cost savings from the 24-hour version concerns placing the medicine into tablets. Since 
the absolute difference in the number of tablets is small, one would not expect large cost 
differences.
17 
Table 4. Prices for Different Brands, Dosages and Package Sizes of Pseudoephedrine 
Hydrochloride 
30 mg/tablet 120 mg/tablet 240 mg/tablet
Number of Tablets Sudafed Walgreens Contac Sudafed Walgreens Sudafed
5 $5.99 
10 $6.79 $6.49 $3.99  $9.99 
20 $9.49 $10.49 $6.49 
24 $6.79 $3.49 
48 $9.49 $5.99 
96 $14.99   
 
Source:  Prices observed at Walgreens at 757 N. Michigan Ave. in Chicago on April 3, 2003. 
 
                                                 
17 Note that one odd feature of the table is that the price of 96 Walgreens Maximum Strength tablets is more 
than double the price of a package with half the number of tablets. That price is the exception, however. In 
general, the price per tablet is lower for larger package sizes. 
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3. Package  Size  Effects 
 
The third empirical regularity we document concerns package size, which is 
another form of bundling. A package of 200 tablets is a bundle of two packages of 100 
tablets. In addition to providing evidence of another source of gains from bundling, 
evidence on the prices of different package sizes will yield insights into the fixed costs of 
product offerings. 
Pain relief medications provide better evidence about package size effects than do 
decongestants or antihistamines because they come in a broader range of packages. 
Figure 1 presents the data on extra strength acetaminophen and Figure 2 presents the data 
on ibuprofen. Each graph contains two series, one for branded versions and one for the 
Walgreens product. All four of the series are concave and would appear to have a positive 
intercept. 
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B. Regression Results 
 
With the above results in hand, we now seek to estimate a single regression 
equation to characterize the gains consumers realize from purchasing bundled products. 
The data set we collected had 305 observations. However, these included a variety of 
dosage forms, such as tablets, liquids, and liqui-gels.  To avoid any misspecification from 
how we treat dosage forms, we restricted attention to tablets or delivery forms typically 
priced the same as tablets.
18 This eliminated a large fraction of the medicines with cough 
suppressants. Also, the variety of active ingredients to treat coughs is substantially greater 
than the variety of decongestants, antihistamines, and pain relievers; and we were 
12 
                                                 
18 This filter excluded any medicines in liquid or packet form as well as “liqui-gels,” which typically sell 
for a premium. It includes caplets. Preliminary – Do not redistribute or cite without permission 
concerned that we would be unable to get reliable estimates of how each cough 
suppressant is priced. As a result, we excluded cough medicines. More precisely, we 
restricted attention to tablets in which the active ingredients were limited to the pain 
relievers acetaminophen and ibuprofen, the decongestant pseudoephedrine hydrochloride, 
and the antihistamines chlorpheniramine maleate and diphenhydramine HCl.
19 This left 
us with 112 observations. 
In order to capture brand effects and the non-linearities in package size 
documented above, we chose the following specification: 
(1)    
22
01 2 3 4 5
1
N
ii i i i i i i
j
Pb b Bb Tb T b T Bb TB c Z
=
=+ + + + + + ∑ j i j
                                                
where: 
Pi is the price of package i 
Ti is the number of tablets in package i 
Bi is a brand name dummy for package i 
Zij is the amount of ingredient j in package i 
The presence of a brand premium raises issues for the effect of bundling in this 
case. To see the general issue, consider Table 1. For the branded products, the bundle 
discount is computed as the price of Tylenol Sinus (or Sudafed Sinus Headache) with the 
sum of the prices of Tylenol Extra Strength and Sudafed Maximum Strength. Both of the 
prices of the component products include a brand premium.
20 Unless the price of the 
 
19 Thus, we excluded medicines with cough suppressants. The products we observed contained a much 
greater variety of cough suppressants than of the other types of ingredients, and we were concerned that we 
did not have sufficient data to estimate with much accuracy the price effects of each cough suppressant. 
20 The fact that Tylenol is a Johnson & Johnson brand while Sudafed is a Pfizer brand is of interest, but a 
similar issue would arise if the same company owned both. 
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bundled product includes a double brand premium, then part of the bundle discount 
reflects a brand premium effect.
21 
Our specification allows the brand premium to be a quadratic function of the 
number of tablets. While this functional form allows for some flexibility in estimating 
how companies impose a brand premium, it does not allow the brand premium to be a 
function of the number of active ingredients. Neither does it allow for the brand premium 
to depend on the volume of active ingredient per tablet.
22 We ran regressions in which the 
brand premium could depend on the number of active ingredients. They provided no 
evidence that bundled, branded products command a higher (absolute) premium than do 
unbundled ones.
23 






2.31 0.029 3.3 10 0.63 0.054 1.23 10
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+++++
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(Note: Values in parenthesis are absolute values of asymptotic t-statistics based on 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. * denotes significance at 1 percent (two-
tailed) level.) 
 
21 As we will see, the brand effect accounts for a substantial piece of the bundle discount in this case. 
Exactly how to interpret this effect would require a better understanding of the source of brand premia than 
one can currently get from the economics literature. The branding effect could easily be the subject of an 
entire other paper. In this paper, we merely document the effect and leave its explanation as a potential 
avenue for future research. 
22 If, for example, one compares the three different strengths of Tylenol described above, it would be of 
interest to estimate whether the brand premium depends on the number of tablets or on the amount of 
acetaminophen. 
23 We believe that the branding effect of bundling is potentially of great interest in understanding branding, 
but we do not pursue it in more detail here because we suspect that it is not a common effect of bundling.     




 IBi = ibuprofen in package i in units of 200 mgs 
 ACi = acetaminophen in package i in units of 500 mgs  
  PHi = pseudoephedrine hydrochloride in package i in units of 30 mgs  
                                                
 CMi = chlorpheneramine maleate in package i in units of 2 mgs 
 DIi = diphenhydramine in package i in units of 25 mgs 
 
The coefficients on the active ingredients are all positive. The coefficients on the 
amount of acetaminophen and on ibuprofen are small and imprecisely determined. That 
they are small makes sense. The price of both bulk acetaminophen and bulk ibuprofen is 
approximately $8/kg,
24 which would contribute $0.004 per 500 mg acetaminophen tablet 
and $0.0016 per 200 mg ibuprofen tablet. 
These regressions reveal three primary sources of gains to consumers from buying 
bundled products. The first is the intercept term of $2.31, which is highly statistically 
significant. The purchaser of the bundled product pays one fixed component in the price 
term. Purchasers of the two separate products would pay two. The second component is 
associated with the number of tablets. It is 0.029 Ti – 3.3 x 10
-5 Ti
2. Again, purchasers of 
the bundled product pay this component once. Purchasers of two separate products would 
pay it twice. This component of the savings comes to $0.67 for 24-tablet packages and 
$1.29 for 48-tablet packages. Thus, the cost-based savings absent of brand effects is 
$2.98 for 24 tablet packages and $3.60 for 48 tablet packages. The third component 
 
24 See http://www.the-innovation-group.com/ChemProfiles/Acetaminophen.htm and 
www.tulika.com/exportprices.htm 
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applies only to purchasers of branded products. It is given by 0.63 + 0.54 Ti – 0.00012 
Ti
2. It amounts to $1.84 and $2.92 for 24-tablet and 48-tablet packages, respectively.
25 
 
III.  Modeling the Bundle Discount 
 
In Evans and Salinger (2004a), we present a cost-based model that serves as a 
unified framework for understanding bundling and tying under competition.  In this 
section, we apply that framework to model the bundle discount we have observed.
26 
 The essential features of the framework are: 
1.  There are two products, A and B, that can be sold separately or 
bundled; 
2.  Some customers want A, some want B, and some want both; 
3.  The marginal cost of the bundle might be lower than the sum of the 
marginal costs of the components; 
4.  There is a fixed cost of each product offering; 
5.  Markets are perfectly contestable, which implies that prices equal 
average cost; and  
6.  The prices for the goods offered in the market are sustainable. 
 
The first three of these seem readily applicable to this case. The different 
medications can be (and are) sold both separately and in combination. To use the 
example in Table 1, some people have a headache and want just acetaminophen. Some 
people have a cold and want just a decongestant. Some have a sinus headache and want 
both. Because of savings in packaging, making tablets, and transactions expense, the 
marginal cost of the bundled product is less than the sum of the marginal costs of the 
unbundled items. 
                                                 
25 These estimates are for the savings from buying a bundled medicine with two active ingredients as 
compared with buying the components separately. The effect would be twice as large for products with 
three active ingredients as compared with buying all three separately. 
26 In broad terms, either the bundle discount reflects cost differences or it is price discrimination. See Evans 
and Salinger (2004b) for a discussion of why the discount is not entirely (or even primarily) price 
discrimination.  
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Assumption 3 implies that, without some constraint on the products offered, there 
is an advantage to having the bundle available in addition to the separate components. 
The bundle makes it possible to satisfy the demand of people who want both components 
at a lower cost and, therefore, price. In practice, another efficiency of bundling is that it 
provides convenience. If so, consumers who want both components would be willing to 
pay a convenience premium to buy them in bundled form. It would be trivial to extend 
the model to allow for a convenience premium. We do not do so here for two reasons. 
First, we want to keep the model simple, and marginal cost savings are sufficient to make 
those who want both components prefer to buy them in bundled form. Second, under 
competition, the convenience value would not be reflected in prices. Measuring it would 
require more precise estimates of demand than we attempt here. 
The fourth assumption is necessary to capture the possibility of tying. Tying, as 
an economic matter, occurs when the two products are sold in bundled form and at least 
one of the products is not available separately. As such, it represents a limitation on the 
products that are offered. To make sense of this limitation when there are some customers 
who would like the component that is not offered, there needs to be some product-
specific scale economy. The simplest way to model these scale economies is to assume a 
fixed cost of each product offering. 
Tying is a prevalent practice under competition. Indeed, our objective in 
formulating the model was to understand tying under competition. Given that scale 
economies are necessary to understand tying, however, one cannot assume perfect 
competition. The contestability assumption is a way of incorporating competition into a 
model when scale economies are present. Like any model, it should be viewed as an 
17 Preliminary – Do not redistribute or cite without permission 
approximation. The key implication of a contestability model is that prices are 
determined primarily by costs with the underlying elasticity of demand playing at most a 
secondary role. This perspective is in distinct contrast to price discrimination models. In 
evaluating whether contestability is a reasonable approximation, we need to consider 
whether the threat of entry is the primary constraint on the extent to which prices can 
exceed costs. Given the substantial number of large companies that would seem to have 
the capability to produce and market any one of these products, that assumption strikes us 
as being reasonable. 
In this case, tying does not occur.
27 In the Evans-Salinger model, however, mixed 
bundling is a possible outcome, so the absence of tying is not a reason to reject the 
model. Moreover, fixed costs of product offerings are likely present in this case even if 
they are not sufficient to result in tying.
28 Each additional stock keeping unit (sku) 
imposes a cost on a retailer as it must order the product, maintain inventories, and so on.  
In addition, each distinct product sold by a retailer must occupy a shelf slot. The cost of 
these slots is an example of what accountants refer to as “semi-fixed” or “step” costs. 
They are not fixed with respect to all levels of output, but they are incurred in discrete 
units (or “steps”). Whether or not such costs should be deemed primarily fixed or 
primarily marginal depends on the size of the steps relative to total demand. We do not 
have the information one would need to determine whether shelf space should be 
                                                 
27 This comment requires some qualification. To take one example, Johnson & Johnson sells 
acetaminophen alone and acetaminophen in combination with pseudoephedrine HCl. It does not sell 
pseudoephedrine HCl alone. While this is technically tying from the standpoint of the company, the market 
outcome does not entail tying. One can purchase pseudoephedrine HCl. Moreover, because Johnson & 
Johnson does sell Tylenol without any additional active ingredients, its tying is not the sort that could raise 
antitrust concerns. 
28 The model assumes that consumers who want just one component are willing to buy it as part of the 
bundle. In economics terminology, we assume free disposal. That plainly does not apply to this case. Many 
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considered a fixed or marginal expense, but it is at least plausible that it is more nearly 
fixed.
29 
In the simplest version
30 of the model, let X1 be the number of people who want 
just good 1, X2 be the people who want just good 2, and XB be the number of people who 
want both. Let F be the fixed cost of a product offering, c1 and c2 be the marginal cost of 
goods 1 and 2, respectively, and cB be the marginal cost of the bundle with cB ≤ c1 + c2. 
Letting p1, p2, and pB be the prices of goods 1 and 2 and of the bundle, then the 
contestable prices are: 





=+ ∈ B  
and the discount for the bundle (DB) is given by: 







+−=+−+ + −  
As equation (4) makes clear, there are two possible sources of the bundle discount. One is 
marginal cost savings, c1 + c2 - cB. The other concerns fixed costs. A customer who buys 
the two components separately contributes to two fixed costs; the purchaser of the 
bundled product only contributes to one.  
Without knowing X1, X2, and XB, we cannot be sure that the bundle discount is 
attributable at all to fixed costs. As a practical matter, however, it likely is. To cover its 
                                                                                                                                                 
people with just a headache would no doubt prefer just a pain reliever to a pain reliever plus decongestant 
combination. 
29 One relevant piece of information is the number of shelf slots devoted to an item. In grocery stores, it is 
common to observe multiple slots devoted to two-liter bottles of Coca-Cola, and the number of slots 
increases when Coca-Cola is a sale item. In that case, the shelf space should be treated as a marginal cost. 
When just one shelf slot is devoted to an item, there is a stronger case for treating shelf space as a fixed 
cost. 
30 In this version, demand by each group is treated as being perfectly inelastic within the range of prices 
that might prevail. See the appendix to Evans and Salinger (2004a) for an extension to price-sensitive 
demand. 
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costs, a retailer must “mark up” the prices of the items it sells. Unless the retail mark-up 
on the bundled item is at least the sum of its mark-ups on the components—and there is 
no reason to suppose that it is—then part of the customer savings reflects retail mark-ups. 
A key result in Evans and Salinger (2004a) is that mixed bundling can occur even 
if it is not the set of offerings that minimizes total costs. Under mixed bundling, there has 
to be a bundle discount,
31 but the private savings from the bundle discount do not 
necessarily represent social savings. If we let SB be the cost savings from offering the 
bundle











c c c SB
B
B − − = − − + =  
The first three terms of (5), which reflect marginal costs, are identical to (4). With the 
marginal costs, private savings reflect social savings. The last term of (5) is also the last 
term of (4). There is a social fixed cost of offering the bundle that must be subtracted 
from the marginal cost savings. In a contestable market, purchasers of the bundle bear 
this cost as well. The difference between (4) and (5) comes from the two terms in (4) that 
reflect the average fixed costs of the two component goods. If those who want both 
components were to buy them separately, the prices they would pay would reflect these 
fixed costs. When they buy the bundle instead, they get a private benefit from not 
contributing to those fixed costs, but there is no corresponding social benefit because the 
fixed costs of the components are not reduced.  
                                                 
31 Otherwise, consumers who want both components would not buy the bundle. 
32 SB represents the savings from offering the bundle given that goods 1 and 2 are also offered. 
20 Preliminary – Do not redistribute or cite without permission 
The last part of equation (5) provides a simple approach to inferring the cost 
savings from the bundle (under mixed bundling) from the bundle discount. It says that the 
cost savings (per consumer of the bundle) are the bundle discount minus the average 
fixed cost portion of the prices of the two separate goods. 
The following pair of examples illustrates the point: 
Example 1:  c1 = c2 = 2, cB = 2.9, F = 0, X1 = X2 = XB = 100 
 
Example 2:  c1 = c2 = 1, cB = 1.9, F = 100, X1 = X2 = XB = 100 
 
In both cases, the unique sustainable outcome is mixed bundling with p1 = p2 = 2 and pB = 
2.9.
33 The bundle discount is substantial. In example 1, the bundle discount entirely reflects 
social savings. The total cost of meeting demand with mixed bundling is 690. The cost of 
meeting demand with components selling would be 800, or 110 more. In example 2, the 
total cost of meeting demand with mixed bundling is also 690, just as in example 1. In 
contrast to example 1, however, the total cost of meeting demand with components selling 
would be only 600.
34 Unless the bundled product provides convenience for the customers 
who want both items, the mixed bundling would be inefficient despite the substantial bundle 
discount. 
                                                 
33 This point should be obvious for example 1. For example 2, the prices under pure components selling 
would be $1.50 (calculated as 1 + 100/200) for each item. Customers who buy both pay a total of 3. This 
outcome is not sustainable because it is susceptible to entry with the bundle at a price of 2.9. Similarly, 
pure bundling is not sustainable. The price under pure bundling would be 1.9 + 100/300 ≈ 3.23. That price 
is not sustainable because an entrant could break even selling either component at a price of 3. 
34 In example 2, there are some marginal cost savings from bundling. If there were no marginal cost savings 
from bunding, then  mixed bundling would still be sustainable (and inefficient), but it would not be the 
unique sustainable outcome. Components selling would be sustainable as well. Mixed bundling can be the 
unique sustainable outcome with no marginal cost savings from bundling if XB is greater than the 
geometric mean of X1 and X2. For a more complete explanation, see Evans and Salinger (2004a). 
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A similar point applies to the individual components. Under mixed bundling, the 
price of each component has to be less than the price of the bundle,
35 but that does not 
imply that offering the separate good lowers costs. If we let DCi and SCi be the discount 
and cost savings (per customer of good i) of offering good i (given that the bundle is 
offered), we have: 
(6) 
i B














c c SC − = − − =  
 Equation (7) says that to infer the cost savings from having a component available 
separately, one must subtract the average fixed cost component of the price of the bundled 
good from the component discount. 
Referring back to our pricing regression, the bundle discount has three 
components: the intercept, the coefficients on the tablet variables, and the coefficients on 
the brand-name variables. As noted above, we focus on the first two. The estimated 
equation distinguishes between price components that are fixed and variable with respect 
to package size. Within our model, however, the key distinction is whether or not the 
costs are fixed or marginal with respect to a customer. The cost of placing active 
ingredients into tablets and, to some extent, the cost of the package itself, are examples of 
costs that are marginal with respect to both package size and to the customer. To the 
extent that package costs rise less than proportionately with the number of tablets, 
                                                 
35 Another simplifying assumption of our model is that consumers who want just one of the goods get no 
utility or disutility from the other good. As a result, they view the bundle as a perfect substitute for the good 
they want. That assumption does not apply to our application, since, for example, many consumers who 
want just a pain reliever would prefer not to have to take a decongestant as well. Just as it would be easy to 
incorporate a convenience value for the bundle in the model, we could also assume that consumers who 
want just one component are willing to pay a premium not to have it bundled with the other. 
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however, then part of packaging cost would be reflected in our intercept term. Even 
though this component is fixed with respect to package size, it is variable with respect to 
the customer.
36 Another example of this kind of cost is the cost of the time it takes a clerk 
to process a transaction. Finally, some costs are fixed both with respect to the customer 
and to the size of the package. The costs of having an additional sku and, to a large 
extent, the cost of shelf space are examples.
37 
 
IV.   Decomposing Fixed and Marginal Cost Effects with Package Size 
Pricing Regularities 
We now show how to use the package-size regularities documented in Section II to  
decompose the bundle and component discounts into marginal cost and fixed cost 
components. This decomposition will then allow us to measure the (possibly negative) cost 
savings (per customer) from each product. 
1. Theory 
 
The key to understanding the size of the the product-specific fixed costs is to 
observe products that could conceivably exist but do not.
38 In the cases we have considered, 
product tying does not occur. Among the products sold in bundled form that we have 
                                                 
36 Our argument that the packaging cost is reflected at least partially in the intercept term does not require 
that the packaging cost equation literally has a positive intercept. If we observed packaging costs directly, 
our estimates of the marginal cost savings from bundling would be based on the cost of a package of a 
given size, such as 24 tablets or 48 tablets. Taken, literally, the intercept reflects the cost of a 0-tablet 
package, which is irrelevant for computing the gains from bundling. Given our choice of a quadratic 
functional form, however, the cost of a pacakge of a particular size would be reflected in part in the 
intercept. 
37 It is possible that some costs might be variable with respect to package size but fixed with respect to the 
customer. This could happen if, for example, larger packages require more shelf space. Our procedure for 
estimating the component of price that covers fixed costs ignores this possibility. 
38 Other papers that use or suggest an analogous approach to estimating fixed costs are Bresnahan and Reiss 
(1987), Pakes and McGuire (1994), Ericson and Pakes (1995), Fershtman and Pakes (2000), Miravete 
(2004), and Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry (2004). 
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considered, all the component medicines are available separately. Rather than looking to 
products that do not exist, we look to package sizes that are not offered. The price-package 
size relationships presented in Figures 1 and 2 provide evidence of economies of package 
size. As a consequence, customers who want a large quantity are better off buying one large 
package than several smaller ones. However, not all possible package sizes are offered. For 
example, the Walgreens in question sold Extra Strength Tylenol in packages of 24, 100, 
150, 200, and 225. It did not, however, sell packages of 175. There does not seem to be any 
reason to suppose that there were no customers who would most prefer to buy 175. Such a 
customer must choose between buying a package of 200 and wasting 25 of them or buying a 
package of 150 and supplementing the package of 150 with, say, another package of 24.
39 
Given the economies of package size, neither of these solutions would give the customer as 
good a price as he would get if a package of 175 were available on the market. 
To estimate the cost factor that prevents the package of 175 from being introduced,   
we need to introduce some theory that extends the contestability analysis from our previous 
paper. The general approach is to view the set of products offered and their prices as a 
sustainable market outcome, which means that entry with another product, (which in this 
case is a different package size), is not profitable. Let Qi, Yi, and Pi be the package size, 
number of purchasers, and price of package i  for i = 1 or 2 with Q1 <  Q2. Let C(.) be the 
marginal cost of selling a package of a particular size to an extra customer. Then, the 
contestability result that price equals average cost implies: 






                                                                                                                                                 
 
39 This choice would, of course, leave the consumer one pill short of his desired quantity. 
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Let Q be the average of Q1 and Q2, and assume that if Q were offered at a lower price, half 










We now need to make the simplifying assumptions that Q1 and Q2  are close enough to each 
other that a linear approximation of the marginal cost function is reasonable and that Y1=Y2. 
With these additional assumptions, it is straightforward to show that the condition that 












The left-hand side of (10) is the component of the price that goes to covering the 
fixed cost. Each successive pair of package sizes yields an estimate. Figure 3 shows a 
histogram of our estimates of the lower bounds of the fixed costs taken from the data 
underlying Figures 1 and 2. The mean value is $1.33, the median is $1.20, and the modal 
range is $1.00 to $1.50. Taking the median as our estimate, we estimate that $1.20 of 
each package price represents a contribution to fixed costs. 
                                                 
40 This condition only insures that the existing offering is sustainable with respect to entry half way 
between two package sizes that are offered. More generally, one might impose the condition that the 
offering be sustainable with respect to all possible intermediate package sizes. In doing so, however, one 
would probably not make our simplifying assumptions about marginal cost and demand.        
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In Section II, we estimated a cost-based savings
41 of $2.98 and $3.60 for 24-count 
and 48-count packages of tablets with two active ingredients. Given our estimate of $1.20 
as the part that reflects a contribution to fixed costs, the implied marginal cost savings are 
$1.78 and $2.40. Using equation (5), we estimate that the cost savings per customer from 
the bundled products are $0.58 and $1.20, respectively.  
Both the private and net savings would be larger for tablets that combine three 
active ingredients. The private savings are twice as large, so they are $5.96, which 
reflects $3.56 in marginal cost savings and $2.40 in average fixed cost. From the 
26 
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marginal cost savings of $3.56, which represents a social benefit, we must subtract the 
$1.20 average fixed cost of the additional offering. The net cost savings are $2.36. 
The gains from bundling would also be larger for larger packages. For example, 
for packages of 48 tablets, our regression equation implies private gains of $3.60 and 
$7.20 for tablets that combine two ingredients and three ingredients, respectively. The net 
effect on costs would then be savings of $1.20 and $3.60 for the bundled products.
42 
We can also use equation (8) to estimate whether there are cost savings from 
offering the stand-alone products. Consider again the example in Table 1. The regression 
results indicate that for people who want just acetaminophen, the marginal cost of buying 
acetaminophen bundled with pseudoephedrine hydrochloride would be $0.065 ⋅ 24 = 
$1.56. As this exceeds our estimate of the average fixed cost of $1.20, we estimate the 
cost savings from having the stand-alone acetaminophen product to be $0.36. For 
consumers who want just pseudoephedrine hydrochloride, the regression results imply 
that the marginal cost of buying it bundled with acetaminophen would be $0.012 ⋅ 24 = 
$0.29. As this incremental cost is less than the average fixed cost, it would lower costs 
not to offer the 24-tablet package of just pseudoephendrine hydrochloride. In other 
words, tying would lower costs.
43 
 
V. Summary and Conclusions  
As we discuss in greater detail in Evans and Salinger (2004b), bundling and tying 
law is unsettled in both the United States and Europe. We believe that policy makers 
                                                 
42 The calculations are $3.60 – 2 ⋅ $1.20 = $1.20 and $7.20 – 3 ⋅ $1.20 = $3.60. 
43 Assuming that the groups that want just pseudoephedrine HCl and that want the bundled product are of 
equal size, tying would also be sustainable. By pricing the bundled product to attract the group that wants 
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would welcome insights from the economics literature on how to formulate a more 
sensible policy. To date, however, that literature has been largely theoretical.
44  If there is 
to be an empirical literature on bundling and tying that informs policy, it must be based 
on some underlying theory. We believe that the framework we have used in this paper 
will prove to be superior to competing frameworks both because it is more tractable and 
because it more nearly captures the essence of most of the bundling and tying that occurs 
in practice.  
When we apply our framework to over-the-counter pain relief and cold medicines, 
we find a substantial bundle discount, which we interpreted within a cost-based model of 
bundling and tying under competition. The model highlights the importance of 
distinguishing between the effects of fixed and marginal costs. Either can give rise to a 
bundle discount, but whether mixed bundling is the set of product offerings that minimizes 
the cost of satisying different types of customers depends critically on the relative 
contribution of each effect. 
                                                                                                                                                 
just the decongestant, the average fixed costs could be reduced from $1.20 to $0.60. This $0.60 price 
reduction would more than offset the $0.29 marginal cost associated with the extra active ingredient. 
44 An exception is Crawford (2004). 
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